Abstract

There is an erupting interest in the fields of international migration and citizenship studies that deals with the increasing transnational linkages and politics. Crucial amount of work in this field focuses on the immigrant networks’ activities oriented toward their home country or the integration and citizenship practices of host countries. However, less attention is given to the politics of the countries of origin, which engage in the transnational sphere via their immigration or foreign policy decisions. In addition to this gap, the configurations between states and immigrants are considered through the framework of “new migrations” or more proximate territorial arrangements. This kind of approach leaves aside the historical constructions of transnational memberships that have emerged as a response to the nation-state building process in the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper I suggest analyzing the politics of the Turkish state about “Turks abroad” as a process of defining the status of and constructing the perceptions about its transnational members. Falling back on transnationalism and diaspora studies, this paper aims to bring together the policies of the Turkish state regarding its emigrants abroad and its co-ethnics who have been stranded long-ago, during the collapse of the empire from which it had emerged. Looking from the point of view of the sending state/external homeland, it compares the different trajectories and policies which have been put in place during different periods, and traces the parallel actions which have been taken over the last two decades regarding both constellations. The paper also investigates the way in which the extra-territorial membership is constructed and defined – by putting emphasis on its fluidity over time as a result of endogenous and exogenous factors.

Keywords: Emigrant, diaspora, accidental diaspora, kin, transnationalism
Introduction

There is an erupting interest in the fields of international migration and citizenship studies that deals with the increasing transnational linkages and politics. Crucial amount of work in this field focuses on the immigrant networks’ activities oriented toward their home country or the integration and citizenship practices of host countries. However, less attention is given to the politics of the countries of origin, which engage in the transnational sphere via their immigration or foreign policy decisions. In addition to this gap, the configurations between states and immigrants are considered through the framework of “new migrations” or more proximate territorial arrangements. This kind of approach leaves aside the historical constructions of transnational memberships that have emerged as a response to the nation-state building process in the beginning of the 20th century.

In this paper, I take the case of Turkey in order to reflect on state policies regarding emigrants and co-ethnics abroad. Turkey is a crucial case for being both a country of emigration with over 4.5 million of its citizens living abroad and a country of immigration and a kin-state for prompting the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The paper is built on an analysis of the debates at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, five year development plans by the State Planning Organization, archival research of the journal Milliyet and secondary resources from the establishment of the state up to date. The research does not restrict its scope to the conceptions of Turkish citizenship of the republican era, but also takes into account the path dependencies based on the citizenship practices of the pre-republican period.

The first two sections review the literatures on transnationalism, politics on migrant and accidental diasporas in order to develop a conceptual framework. Then, the paper provides the histories of two trajectories of two different constellations (migrant diasporas and accidental diasporas) in order to illustrate the diverging conceptualizations regarding those who are included as members but are not within the borders of the nation state. Therefore it depicts a picture of two different trajectories adopted by the Turkish state as an emigrant sending country and as a kin-state, over a period of more than a century. The final section elaborates on the two arguments: first, despite their differences the two trajectories share commonalities when considering the determination of physical and social borders and second, there is a convergence of the policies with the increasing interest from the part of the Turkish state in monitoring, controlling, coordinating and investing in both the emigrants and co-ethnics abroad.

Transnationalism and politics on diasporas

Transnationalism and diaspora are two concepts which have quickly emerged, dispersed and become fashionable in various fields of social sciences since the mid 1990s. Although initially representing two diverging perspectives on cross border practices from an agency perspective, the changes in their conceptualizations bridged them together within the discipline of migration studies. Another line of though also emerged within this literature that extended beyond the conceptual framework of emigrant practices and host country opportunity
structures, to include the role of the origin countries. This new prism engendered new questions about transnational membership and nation-building.

In their beginnings, transnationalism and diaspora appeared to signify very different understandings of cross border relations. Diaspora was used “to denote religious or national groups living outside an (imagined) homeland” (Faist 2010, 9). The term was commonly juxtaposed to the typical archetypes of Jewish, Armenian and Greek communities, attributing a “victimized” character to these populations. “Diaspora” as a concept remained as dormant until recently. It was in the 1990s that scholars sought to broaden and typologize the concept under subheadings, such as in Cohen’s (1997) categorization of “victim”, “trade”, “labor” and “colonial” diasporas. Nevertheless different nation cases with diverse mobility histories have shown that the categorization of certain nations under certain subheadings of diaspora was not possible\(^1\); and that the term could not be attributed to any single type of community representing all times (Kokot et al. 2004, 3). While the older conceptualizations of diaspora clearly implied a return to an (imagined) homeland (Safran 1991), newer uses of the term replaced it “with dense and continuous linkages across borders” (Faist 2010, 12). Rather than bounding within the imagery of origin and destination, the new meanings included countries of onward migration (Faist 2010) and the multiplicity of spaces.

Transnationalism on the other hand had a more ambiguous character in terms of defining and positioning, because of receiving attention from diverging fields of social sciences. “Transnational” as a concept was first used in the 1970 by the scholars of international relations scholars, in order to denote the importance of global interactions and impacts on interstate politics (Vertovec 2009). These first accounts were approaching to the issue from more statist and top-down perspectives, making “transnational” a vague concept together with international and multinational. As these terms were more clearly defined, the top-down perspective of the “transnational” was left behind. This was reinforced when the disciplines of anthropology and migration studies adopted the term “transnational” and made “transnationalism” a new analytical focus in their fields (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Basch et al. 1994; Kearney 1995; Appadurai 2011; Cohen 1997; Levitt 2001) in the 1990s. At the time, the term was coined with the lasting relationships and repeated movements across borders, in which the agents were not states or nations, but individual actors or associations (Kokot et al. 2004, 4).

The prevailing theories of transnationalism in migration studies of the 1990s focused on the role of agency. It is interesting to note that one of the first groups of scholars who formed the “transnational migration studies” in its beginnings came up with four points that emphasized the embeddedness of emigrant-home state relations after the act of migration:

\(^1\) Kokot et al. (2004) give the example of Greek communities. Greek enclaves that had significant input in the 15th century after the fall of Constantinople represent an archetypal “victim” diaspora. Greek communities emigrating to United States and Australia in the 19th and 20th centuries were also exemplified as a “diaspora” group, yet this time they would be defined under the “labor diaspora” subheading.
(1) Nation-states continue to shape transmigrants’ actions and identities, (2) the nature, pattern, intensity and types of transnational connections of migrants vary with class, gender and generation, (3) states often try to encompass and redirect the transnational activities of migrants, and (4) continuities as well as differences, exist between contemporary and past patterns of transnational migration (Glick Schiller, “Centrality” 120-1, in Sheffer 2006).

The four points did not reflect a mere bottom-up perspective but depicted a picture of a tripartite relationship including the home countries, host countries and emigrants. Despite this founding definition, the dominating literature in the field at the time focused theories of the imagined and hybridized attributes of borderless “transnational social spaces”. These studies had a common understanding that the transnational migrants were creating new forms of social spaces, networks and identities. With an agent-centered perspective, they celebrated the cosmopolitan, democratizing, liberalizing or reconciling capabilities of transnational spaces which could open the doors of a more peaceful world.

The challenge against these theories came from two different and interlinked positions. The first of these arguments came from another agency-centered perspective (Kaldor 1996; Sheffer 2006). According to the critique, the sentiment of belongingness that was strengthened by increased communications and networks did not only entail in relatively fixed terms -such as belonging in the sense of embracing multiple social and cultural identities- but also included more active forms of belonging, such as transnational political activity. The new forms of transnationalism and globalization were by no means eliminating the perseverance of the non cosmopolitan values, “and even [strengthening] ethnicity, nationalism and ethnonationalism” (Sheffer 2006, 124). Contrary to the previous claims, certain categories of dispersed persons would attribute perennial qualities to their collective identities, providing room for greater cohesion and solidarity (Sheffer 2010, 128-129).

The second challenge brought the state back in. Along with the increases in the movements of people and the practices that crossed borders, there were also analogous changes occurring among the sending countries. Such countries were more willing than ever to consider rights such as dual citizenship, voting rights or increased relations in order to maintain and keep the links with their expatriates abroad, while at the same time providing them external membership rights (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Bauböck 2010; Faist and Kivisto 2007). Contrary to the first perceptions of the home states vis-à-vis the emigrants – ranging from “traitors” who abandoned their homelands to distant workers who will return in the near future – the policies giving external membership rights embraced the emigrants’ integration in the receiving countries. According to Bauböck (2003, 710) sending states tend to have much less control over migration patterns, and they rather design emigration policies to maximize certain interests. Therefore the role of the sending states had to be considered within the framework of transnationalism because the states were increasingly actively involved in the practices, structures and discourses of emigrants.
As the concept of diaspora was broadened to include newer waves of migration, and transnationalism was expanded to get beyond the promises of cosmopolitanism, the two terms approached very close to one another: former signifying the agent and latter, the practice. The re-definitions of transnationalism emphasized the role of nationalism as well, bridging it with the concept of diaspora. The main argument was that even though transnational practices and discourses did not necessitate nationalist concerns and claims, such claims were very often articulated by emigrants. Contrary to the classical claims of nationalism and nation-building as well as theories on the transition to an age of post-nationalism (Basch et al. 1994; Soysal 1994), the attempts of the states could also extend beyond state borders and aim at binding together not the physical territories but the populations in a homeland territory and abroad (Bauböck 2010, 299-311).

Theories on transnationalism and diasporas in the past were mainly interested in the practices of immigrant populations, as well as the role of host counties in shaping the opportunity structures for the immigrants. More recent accounts on the study of these two concepts focus on the home countries as well. With the introduction of the home state within this framework, new questions arose about external membership, citizenship, as well as nationalism. This new field of research opens up new for new opportunities for research together with states’ other trans-border projects, representing “the apotheosis, not the repudiation, of the principle of the nation-state” (Brubaker 2000).

**Kin-states and accidental diasporas**

There is another line of literature that deals with the trans-border relations of kin-states and co-ethnics in neighboring countries, which developed largely in isolation from studies on transnationalism and diaspora. Portraying the “national unmixing” or ethnic dispersions after the collapse of imperial states, this literature mainly flourished after the collapse of the Soviet Union and focused on the post-Soviet countries such as Russia and Hungary (Brubaker 1996; Laitin 1998; Triandafyllidou 2009; Waterbury 2010). Rather than referring to the movement of people across borders, the mentioned relationship was based on the movement of borders across people (Brubaker 2000) – and therefore diverged substantially from conventional migration theories, based on the elementary action.

The groups who remained within the territories of other states have been called under different titles. Whereas scholars such as Cohen argued against the classification of such groups under diasporas and used other terms as “stranded minorities” (Cohen 1997), others have placed these groups under the concept of diaspora, using terms as “beached diasporas” (Laitin 1998) and “accidental diasporas” (Brubaker 2000; Waterbury 2010). Both “beached diasporas” and “accidental diasporas” referred to the same meaning:

Unlike most other diasporas that are formed gradually and consciously (either voluntarily or involuntarily) with the dispersion of its members across territories, the
beached or accidental diasporas are formed suddenly and largely against the will of their members and often have the citizenship of only their new state of residence\(^2\).

Even though the accidental diasporas are not attributed to a post-migratory condition, it is important to note that a certain migratory process of past is also existent for the formation of these groups. Nevertheless the mentioned migration had not occurred recently, but long time ago, such as in the case of German peasant settlements’ spreading around Europe during the 12th or 13th centuries (Brubaker 2000). Even though the groups do not consider themselves as emigrants, this migratory past creates an imagined “core” of the nation, or a “homeland”, which is not strictly bounded to the actual sequences or paths of dispersal.

The imagination of kin-state as homeland involves a dual relationship between the diaspora groups and the kin-states. For this reason, the active involvement of the kin-state might very often become intensely conflictual, and potentially explosive for the nexus linking diaspora, homeland and host country (Brubaker 2000, 1). Still, the kin-state involvement in the conditions and politics of co-ethnic populations does not necessarily entail immediate justifications of war, regaining recently lost territory or expansionist ambitions. As the cases of post-imperial political structures such as Russia and Hungary have shown, the kin-states continue to be interested in engaging in their co-ethnics abroad even though they do not strive for such interests (Brubaker 1996; Waterbury 2010).

The dissolution of previously multinational political spaces into more homogeneous environments creates different forms of nationalism. According to Brubaker (2000) it is possible to classify them under three distinct forms: “nationalizing” nationalism\(^3\), transborder nationalisms of “external national homelands” and minority nationalism of accidental diasporas\(^4\). The engagement of kin-states in their co-ethnics is positioned under transborder nationalisms; whereas the politics are oriented to “putative ethnonational kin who are residents and citizens of other states” and assert “states’ right –indeed their obligation- to monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, and protect the interests of ‘their’ ethnonational kin in other states” (Brubaker 2000).

Despite a number of differences, the synthesis of kin-state engagements about co-ethnic populations abroad and political transnationalism between emigrants and home states provide a rich venue for research on nationalism, nation-building and external membership. Comparing the two literatures, Bauböck argues that the two constellations are isomorphic with their triangular structures, involving: (a) nationalizing states, (b) national minorities and (c) their external homelands (Brubaker 1996) for minorities and kin-states and (a) host countries, (b) immigrants and (c) sending states for emigrants and homelands (Bauböck 2010).

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\(^2\) As I will be benefiting from Brubaker’s (2000) analytical framework in this paper, I am adopting the term “accidental diaspora” from hereof.

\(^3\) “Nationalizing” nationalism aims at remedying the imagined core nation which is considered to be weakened or embattled culturally, economically, demographically within the imperial state (Brubaker 2000, )

\(^4\) Minority nationalism of accidental diasporas is the form of nationalism that is maintained by the minority groups who demand for state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality (Brubaker 2000).
The triangular structure enables a systematized comparison about the two constellations, which might involve reflecting micro dispositions such as emigrants’ or the ethnic minorities’ identity constructions and political engagement or macro dispositions including states’ policies.

Even though it is necessary to analytically distinguish the two transnational political constellations of kin-state and sending country politics for explanatory and normative purposes, the real world cases do not always provide for clear-cut distinctions and very often create a blurry image (Bauböck 2010, 313). This is especially the case where the migrant populations move back and forth across territories over long periods of times, such as in the case of ethnic Turks who remained in Bulgaria after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, were pushed out of Bulgaria in 1989, became Turkish citizens, reclaimed their Bulgarian citizenship very recently and provided electoral support for the party representing Turkish minorities in Bulgaria (Bauböck 2010, 313; Özgür Baklacıoğlu 2006). The two constellations might be observable under the same political roof, again as in the case of Turkey where: (a) the political and territorial legacy of the Ottoman Empire persists – linking the state to accidental diasporas - and (b) more recent accounts of migration pave the way for new types of memberships – linking the state to emigrants (migration diasporas) in other countries.

Diaspora strategies of kin-states usually serve a specific political and strategic purpose and the actors pushing for the shifts toward increased kin-state engagement are mainly the political elites from both the kin-states (Waterbury 2010) as well as the minority elites in diaspora groups (Bauböck 2010). Similar to the migrant diaspora engagement policies, the kin-state elites aim at having access to a number of resources, such as: the extraction of material resources for economic gain; the utilization of those abroad as a culture-linguistic resource to be used in defining the boundaries of national identity; and as political resources to help create or maintain legitimacy and support for kin-state elites (Waterbury 2010, 6). Aside from the economic and international interests, the engagement in co-ethnics also serves as an instrument for mobilizing domestic political support since it invokes an image of “defender of a larger national community” for the kin-state (Bauböck 2010, 316).

As explained before, studies on accidental diasporas have gained importance after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the researches in this field have mainly focused on the cases in the Central and Eastern Europe, especially Hungary, Romania and Russia. The newly emerging field of research synthesizing the literature on the so called migrant diasporas and accidental diasporas also looks into the post-Soviet countries, which represent a comparatively recent account of post-imperial structure when compared with the typical dissolution of the empires in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Both literatures consider older cases of accidental diasporas as historical repertoires for the new cases, without looking into the current status of kin-state and ethnic minority relations. Hence, there is a gap in the literature on the present status of historical cases of accidental diasporas, in which the kin-states continue on engaging in their co-ethnics naturalized in other countries despite of passing time.
This paper tries to bring together the policies of the Turkish state regarding its emigrants abroad and the co-ethnics who have been stranded long ago, during the collapse of the empire from which it had emerged. Looking from the point of view of the sending state/external homeland, it compares the different trajectories and policies which have been put in place during different periods, and traces the parallel actions which have been taken over the last two decade regarding both constellations. More importantly, the paper investigates the way in which the extra-territorial membership is constructed and defined – by putting emphasis on its fluidity over time as a result of endogenous and exogenous factors.

**Turkey’s emigration policy**

Emigration from Turkey has adopted different visages since the establishment of republic, reflecting diverging state policies and public perceptions regarding membership to the nation state. It is possible to classify major emigration waves from Turkey under six different groups: (1) national unmixing and emigration of non-Muslim communities from the late 19th century until 1960s, (2) mass labor and family migration to Europe and Australia from 1960s until mid-1970s, (4) political migration to Europe during 1980s and 1990s, (5) temporary labor migration to Middle East and North Africa from 1980 to mid-1990s and former Soviet countries since 1990s and, (6) diverging patterns of more sporadic emigration, especially after 1990s onwards including high skilled and student migration to Europe, USA, Canada and Australia. Since this paper focuses on diaspora and homeland politics, this part elaborates mainly on the characteristics of mobility which led to more permanent patterns of settlement, as well as the state’s approach to these migrations. Despite the geographical dispersion of Turkish citizens around the globe, the discussion centers on the migrants living in Europe due to significant concentration in the continent.

The history of the early republic of Turkey was marked by populous waves of migration as a result of the establishment of the nation-state and the solidification of its borders. This period can be called as what Brubaker describes as “national unmixing”, since the expected mobility was for leading out the non-Muslim communities to outside while gathering certain communities that “the state felt secure about” (Kirişci 2000) inside. At the core of the migration policy was settling the newly comers from ex-Ottoman lands: the conception of migrant was referred by the state as those of Turkish culture, moving back to Turkey (İçduyuğ and Sert 2010), not the migrants of other origins or the non-Muslim populations who voluntarily or involuntarily left the country. The state disregarded the post-migratory conditions of those who emigrated from the country, such as in the typical case of Turkish-speaking Christian-Orthodox Karamanlı from Central Anatolia, who experienced integration difficulties after arriving in Greece.

The turning point for the history of Turkey regarding emigration had occurred in the 1960s, when European countries demanded for labor migration in order to respond to the increasing
labor demand for the industrialization. The main aim during these labor agreements was different from the viewpoint of the labor requesting and labor requested country-Turkey-, reflecting the classical core-peripheral model of migration theories: the interest of the European core countries was to respond to the post-war labor shortage via short term migration from less developed countries, while the interest of the peripheral countries in sending migrants was to benefit from emigrants’ economic (export of surplus labor power and remittances) and social (transfer of knowledge and know-how) capitals that they would gain in Europe. For either side, migration was supposed to be temporary.

In line with the rational calculation for benefiting from the emigrants’ projected temporary stay in Europe, the overall state policy was based on facilitating remittance flows and the easy return of labor migrants during the first decade of migrations. Compatible with the 1960s state of mind founded on planned economy for boosting economic growth and development, State Planning Organisation (DPT) and Turkish Employment Service (İİBK) were at the core of the administrative circle regulating the flows of labor migrants (Akgündüz 2008). Remittances were considered as a solution to the perennial foreign exchange crises of the Turkish economy, which was also noted in the DPT’s Second Five Year Development Plan (Sayarı 1986). This pattern continued until 1973 oil crisis which triggered economic stagnation and the halt of state-led labor migration in Western Europe.

Contrary to the previous flows of emigrants consisting primarily of young single men and women from rural backgrounds (Abadan-Unat 2011), subsequent emigration waves comprised of family reunifications, family formations, refugee movements and clandestine labor migration other family members of the already settled emigrants (İçduygu and Sert 2010). The first signs about the permanent settlement of emigrants in Europe appeared in the early 1970s, for which the state responded by taking measures against cultural assimilation and encouraging returns. For instance the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) got involved in the management of the workers abroad, sending imams to European countries in 1971. A program for temporary return migration (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals) was implemented together with UNDP in order to promote voluntary returns (Bilgili and Siegel 2011).

Despite efforts, most emigrants stayed in the European countries and this has become an accepted fact by the Turkish state and public opinion in the late 1970s and 1980s. The change in perception from distant workers to migrant workers, Turkish citizens abroad and even to minorities in Europe can be read from the language used in the parliamentary debates (Artan 2009) and newspapers of the period. In 1976 Milliyet reported a speech by the Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, Minister of Labor of the period about return migrants: “Paksu stated that ‘in parallel to the economic improvements of Western Germany collective mandatory worker returns to homeland have nearly totally halted’ and ‘from the end of 1973 to August 1975, 75 thousand

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Turkish workers have made definite returns to homeland”⁶. Such discourses about returns have left their place to the conditions of those who were staying in the second half of 1980s. In 1989 another article on Milliyet was entitled: “What Kastoryano found out after working for ten years on “our expatriates” (gurbetçi): ‘Turks have settled in Europe’”. Based on an interview with Riva Kastoryano, a sociologist with Turkish origin working in France and United States, the article was informing that “with the emergence of the third generation, Turks were from now on definitely settled in Europe”⁷.

The post-1980 period is characterized by the increasing engagement of the Turkish state with the emigrants in the host countries rather than within Turkish territories. It is argued in the literature that a number of reasons were behind this policy change: the settling of former labor migrants as elaborated above, the emerging patterns of political migration of all sorts of opposition groups (communists, Islamists, Alevi and Kurdish nationalists) fleeing from the military junta to Europe, and the rising cultural revivalist movements of Turkish citizens in European countries (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Avcı 2005; Yüksel 2011; Mügge 2012). Especially in the early 1980s, the policy of the military rule was to reduce the political opposition both within the territories of Turkey and abroad (Mügge 2012).

In addition to the reasons related to the migrants’ characteristics and the political environment in Turkey, legal, political and social conditions in Europe were creating an unwelcoming environment for transnational relations. On the one hand strict citizenship policies in counties such as Germany were obliging emigrants to give up their Turkish citizenships, while on the other hand the rising xenophobia was threatening the security and welfare of emigrants in Europe. Perceived as a path to cultural assimilation of the emigrants, the renouncement of one’s citizenship or membership bonds was not welcome by the Turkish state. But at the same time, the political and economic integration of emigrants in the host countries was considered as a solution to the integration and violence problems (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007).

As a result, the state provided legal and official incentives in order to keep attached, closely monitor and improve the conditions of Turkish emigrants in Europe. In 1981 the state introduced a law that allowed dual citizenship for the first time in Turkey, increasing significantly the number of Turkish citizens who have also obtained the citizenship of a host country (İçduygu 1996; Kadirbeyoğlu 2010). This was followed by the inclusion of Turkish citizens abroad in the 1982 Constitution, in which the Article 62 noted:

The Government takes measures to ensure family unity of the Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their coming back.

As resolved in the constitution, education, culture and social security were considered among the top problems for stabilizing the links between emigrants and homeland. From the 1980s onwards Turkish state started sending “minor armies of Turkish teachers and Imams” via Ministry of Education and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Østergaard-Nielsen 2000, 108). Higher Coordination Council for Workers, consisting of Social Affairs and Economic Affairs Committees was established during this period, in order to keep citizens’ attachment to Turkey alive (Artan 2009). With to a law that was amended in 1986 the state facilitated the way for political incorporation by allowing voting at customs (but not yet in embassies) two or three weeks prior to the elections.

The early 1990s were marked by a number of incentives facilitating the political and social engagement of emigrants with Turkey, such as the Pink Card procedure (which was replaced by Blue Card in 2009) granting rights to those who gave up Turkish nationality, the change in the Turkish Party Law allowing the establishment of Turkish party branches outside of Turkey. According to Kadirbeyoğlu (2010, 297) the aim behind the institution of Pink Card was the problems of citizenship and the rising xenophobia in Europe, which had emerged with events such as in Solingen in 1993. During this period there was a budding belief that voting (and hence obtaining citizenship in Germany) was the key to finding long-terms solutions to problems faced by Turkish person living there.

Overlapping with Turkey’s pre-accession process to the European Union, the period after 1990s is considered as a period of transformation from perceiving emigrants as remittance machines to Euro-Turks with transnational ties (Østergaard Nielsen 2003; Kaya and Kentel 2005). The policy target during this period had a direction towards settlement without losing ties (Mügge 2012). This new era also represents the institutionalization in Turkey for engaging in citizens abroad, not for employment and social security purposes, but in terms of coordinating the actions of different state institutions. In 1998, Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaslardan Danışma Kurulu) and High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad (Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlar Üst Kurulu) were founded under Prime Ministry, in order to search and monitor the problems faced by Turkish citizens abroad and communicate them in the Turkish parliament8. This was followed by the reorganization and expansion of the responsibilities of Foreign Relations and Workers Abroad Services General Directorate (Dış İlişkiler ve Yurtdışı İşçi Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü) under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in 2001 and the establishment of Homeland-Advice Bureau (Yurt-Danış Bürosu) under the DG (Bilgili and Siegel 2011).

One final institutional step was taken with the establishment of the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (Yurtşı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı, YTB) in 2010. With the motto of “Wherever there is our citizen and kin, we are

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there” the department coordinates different institutions’ engagement in citizens and kin communities living abroad, as well as international students living in Turkey and civil society organizations abroad. This presidency will be elaborated in the upcoming parts.

Crucial for this paper is the emerging rhetoric of diaspora in the recent years, employed for the first time in describing Turkish citizens abroad especially by business groups. In a speech that he has given after being elected an Honorary Member in the Board of Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, the CEO of Turkish Coca-Cola heralded the new inclination towards engaging emigrants as settled diasporas with economic, political and social lobbying capabilities for promoting Turkey:

We are supposed to diffuse Turkish lobby to masses abroad. We have to prioritize the endeavors for placing the Turkish diaspora among the most influential diasporas in the world by establishing a sustainable diaspora strategy. We have to help Turkish entrepreneurs all around the world to sail before the wind of rising Turkish trademark.

Contrary to the perception as diffused emigrants from low socioeconomic profile who would one day return to the homeland, the emerging involvement is congruent with transnational perspective to emigrants, what Gamlen (2006, 6) describes as the “symbolic policies discursively attempt(ing) to produce a homogeneous national ‘diaspora’, with close ties to allegiance to the home-state”.

Turkey as a kin-state

The history of Turkey’s engagement in co-ethnics as a kin-state differs from the one about citizens abroad that was depicted in the previous part, since the main determining factor was not emigration but internal politics as well as immigration towards the country. In line with the changing policies, it is possible to classify policies of the modern Turkey as a kin-state under four periods: (1) sorting for governing and promoting returns, (2) keeping ties but phasing down returns and relations; emergence of “external Turks” discourse (3) expansion and early institutionalization for monitoring and coordination (4) re-engagement and transnationalism.

As it was argued in the literature discussion on kin-state policies, accidental diaspora communities are formed a result of the transformation of imperial territories to more restricted nation-state territories. The depiction of the population as a diaspora reflects the construction of an ideal core homeland from which the communities have migrated from in the distant past and the remaining kin who were left out of that core. This perspective constructs an “imagined community” by disregarding the territorial and physical borders and establishing the membership principle based on putative shared traits such as ethnicity or religion.

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The formation of the accidental diasporas after the foundation of Turkish Republic also has a historical past of state-led migration. At the heart of the settlement policy during the Ottoman Empire was “mixing for governing” (İçduygu et al. 2009) and state-led settlement and exile in newly acquired territories was a common norm. The objective of this policy was threefold according to Tekeli (2008): (a) to maintain control over newly acquired territories based on gaza principle (war in the name of faith), (b) settling new people in demographically deprived areas to boost agricultural production and economic growth and (c) settling groups to pressure villagers in order to maintain order and secure the road system.

From late 19th century onwards, first the empire and then the newly formed republic adopted a novel approach of “sorting for governing”. As a result of the shrinking of the state territory, the new migration waves both from inside and toward outside were perceived as international migration contrary to the previous waves that were considered as internal migration (İçduygu et al. 2009). İçduygu et al. (1999) argue that this new perspective was based on an understanding of the Young Turks that “the nation was the source of all authority”, which transformed the empire into a model of homogeneous state based on the premise of one state, on nation. It aimed at homogenizing and unmixing the population via new laws and institutions.

The state-led emigration during this period was maintained by agreements of reciprocity with other countries (in 1913 and 1925 with Bulgaria, in 1923 with Greece) and forced displacements (such as in the case of 1915 Armenian emigration). But the principle concern during this period was on the management of immigrants (muhacir) who entered the country, rather than emigration. The institution for settling the immigrants (Muhacirin Komisyon Alısı) was established in 1872 (İçduygu et al. 2009) which was later transformed into General Directorate on Tribes and Immigrants in 1916 (Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdürlüğü-i Umumiyesi). This was followed by laws and institutions that were put into practice on the eve and after the foundation of the republic; such as the Settlement Law (1923), the Ministry of Population Exchange, Development and Settlement (1923), the Constitution (1924), Turkish Citizenship Law (1928), the Law on Settlement (1934).

The first kin policies during the early republic were based on attracting Muslim populations especially in Balkans and Caucasus. In the words of Ö zgür Baklaçoğlu (2006), the state was making a rational calculation on demographics after having had devastating population losses during the world war and independence wars. Even though considerable numbers of people with this status arrived especially from Balkan countries, others remained in the territories which were outside of the newly established Turkish Republic. For those who have stayed, the Turkish state saw itself as having some say over community affairs because of the Lausanne Treaty that guaranteed in theory the rights of Muslim community living in Western Thrace (Poulton 1995).

The practices of naturalization and settlement of immigrants during this period evoke the conceptions of membership by the policy makers. According to Kirişci (2000, 18), despite the formal definitions of citizenship and national identity emphasizing territoriality rather than
ethnicity in the 1924 Constitution, “Turkish descent and culture” was the main principle in determining those who would be included (Kirişci 2000, 3-4). Moreover, in the actual practice the boundaries were more limited comprising of a religious basis as well and only Hanefi Muslims who spoke Turkish were privileged communities who were accepted to enter the territory as immigrant and refugee with the intention to settle and take up citizenship. These were the people whom “the state ha(d) felt constitutes the very core of the Turkish national identity on which it (could) unyieldingly rely” (Kirişci 2000, 18). With the amendment of 1934 Law on Settlement the state provided refugee and immigrant status to such groups, including Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians and Tatars (Kadirbeyoğlu 2010).

Turkish state’s kin policy which was based on immigration since late 19th century started changing in the 1940s towards less enthusiasm for accepting immigrants, despite the migration waves in the early 1950s from Bulgaria and former Yugoslavia and in the late 1950s from Iraq. This new perception which considered co-ethnics as settled in their historical homelands and Turkey as their second and relative homeland reflected on the new terminology that was created to define co-ethnic communities: “Turkish factors” and “external Turks” (İçduygu et al. 2009). This standing pointed to a “cautious policy towards kins” (Poulton 1995) and the determination of ethnic and national borders as determined by the Westphalian system. İçduygu, Erder and Gençkaya (2009) maintained that behind this policy was an interest in not damaging the relations with host countries, as well as a skepticism vis-à-vis the immigrant groups from Soviet countries due to rising anti-communism.

State’s recession from co-ethnics abroad had not been appreciated by nationalists at the time, who were interested in imagining the Turkish community as extending beyond the borders of the core homeland of Turkish Republic. An example can be found in an article by İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, from Turkish Historical Society (TTK) in the journal Turkish Culture, in 1968:

Naming Turkish communities living outside of the Turkish Republic’s borders as External Turks has become a widespread situation in the recent years. […] According to this concept Turkish race is today politically diverged into two parts. One of them is the Anatolian Turkishness which establishes the national and independent Turkish state, representing the Homeland. Others are Turkish communities attached directly or indirectly to the governing of another state without regarding population majority or minority. […] Based on this description it can be said that Turkish communities living in Asia and Europe are interested in the Turkish Republic as their only, independent and national representative and are waiting for attention regarding their own issues. […] Today 47% of the population in Turkey comprises of Turks who came from abroad, their children and grandchildren. Hence one household in every two in Turkey is concerned about external Turks and their fate (1968, 305).
In the article, Parmaksızoğlu described a picture of two different external Turk communities: one consisted of what he called as Turkish countries such as Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Crimea, Uzbekistan who had autonomous rights within the USSR, and the other was comprised of dispersed groups of Turkish minorities living from China to Greece. This depiction and the positions of Turkish nationalists during this period is illuminating for the subsequent periods which were marked by exogenous conditions such as the dissolution of the USSR (Poulton 1995) and endogenous conditions including the rising nationalist discourse after the 1980 military coup (İçduygu et al. 2009).

From 1980s onwards the Turkish state adopted an ambiguous pattern of kin policy that re-conceptualized the primary homeland discourse but in turn continued on reinforcing the co-ethnics to strand in their historical homelands. The image of primary, core homeland reflected on Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s famous speech of controlling a world “from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China” (Ataman 2002, 128) and emphasis on cultural, historical, ethnic ties with Turks who lived in Iraq, Bulgaria, Caucasus and Central Asia. The mass migration waves during this period were also instrumentalized in the public discourse to maintain this image (Danış and Parla 2009). For instance, the 1989 mass migration from Bulgaria was responded with a populist discourse of victimization of Turkish populations and their “liberation through reuniting with homeland” (İçduygu et al. 2009). Despite the accelerated procedure to nationality provided to ethnic Turks after mass migrations from Bulgaria in 1989 and from Iraq in 1991, the systematic settlement was no more the top priority (İçduygu et al. 2009) and this was followed by the irregularization of immigrants in the subsequent migrations (Danış and Parla 2009).

The first step to institutionalizing Turkey’s new kin policy based on aiding development of co-ethnics abroad took place with the establishment of Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in 1992. According to its website, the agency was founded after the collapse of USSR, during a period when countries from Central Asia and Caucasus gained their independence. Established as an agency for conducting economic, social and cultural activities in what was described as “Turkish Geography”, TIKA adopted new objectives such as education in Turkish (1995) and aiding development.

In his research on institutions that are engaged in “external Turks”, Öge (2009, 195-198) argued that even though TIKA’s principle target group was defined during its foundation as “republics where Turkish is spoken and relative communities”, groups such as Iraqi Turkmen

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10 Parmaksızoğlu uses the terms “Türk”, “Türk ülkeleri”, “Türk devletleri” which is translated as Turkish, rather than Turcic (Türki in Turkish language) - a term very often used to described the same communities.

and Bulgarian Turks who had close ties in the past did not receive much attention. The agency focused more on the five countries entitled as “Turkish Republics” (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) that gained independence in Central Asia after the collapse of USSR. Since 1994, the State Ministry “Responsible for External Turks” is founded within every governmental period, with the responsibility of: (1) maintaining relations with Turkic States, (2) coordinating with Craftsman and Artisans regarding investments in Turkic States, and since 1996, (3) maintaining relations with Turkish Republics and Sibling Communities (Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Kardeş Topluluklar) and research, planning and coordination about them (Öge 2009, 203).

Since the election of the first AKP government in 2002, and the appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009 the Turkish state has adopted a perspective which assembled different groups of what it considered as “external members abroad”. This is evident in the most recent institutional project- the establishment of the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities in 2010\(^1\). As indicated in the previous part, for the first time the Presidency brought different groups considered as “members” of an idealized Turkish community, comprising of: (1) emigrants who went from 1960s onwards for employment purposes, (2) co-ethnics who were stranded after the collapse of Ottoman Empire and were not object to population exchanges in the early 1920s and 1930s, and more interestingly (3) other Turkic communities who have been approached by different Turkish governments after the collapse of Soviet Union as “relative communities”.

**From struggling for definite borders to enjoying transnationalism**

In the previous sections I have depicted a picture of two different trajectories adopted by the Turkish state as an emigrant sending country and as a kin-state, over a period of more than a century. Despite the vital differences which have existed among these two trajectories or constellations, it is possible to trace similarities in the overall approach of the state in determining the status of what it considers as the members abroad. Therefore this section elaborates on the two arguments: *first*, despite their differences the two trajectories share commonalities when considering the determination of physical and social borders and *second*, there is a convergence of the policies with the increasing interest from the part of the Turkish state in monitoring, controlling, coordinating and investing in both the emigrants and co-ethnics abroad.

In terms of its emigration policy, Turkish state was from the beginning actively involved in trying to control and determine the status of its citizens abroad, however its perception regarding the emigrants changed drastically over time. In the earlier periods, Turkey’s

\(^1\) It is worth noting that the Presidency is not entitled with the two terms: “citizens abroad” (yurtdışındaki vatandaşlar), or “external Turks” (diş Türkler) which have been used to define two different categories in the past. Rather the Presidency uses the term “Turks abroad” (yurtdışı Türkler) for defining Turkish emigrants and “kins and relative communities” (soydaş ve akraba toplulukları) to signify groups with historical relations. The term kin is not employed in the main title of the Presidency; nevertheless in its work definition, “kins and relative communities” are used together.
involvement as a sending state was based on instrumentalizing the emigration for decreasing unemployment, and boosting economic growth in Turkey. The policies during this period aimed at benefiting from the social and economic capital of the emigrants acquired in the host country as well as planning the conditions of their return. It was only after the 1980s that the state acknowledged the settlement of workers in the host countries, and developed mechanisms to provide them with external membership rights, such as flexible citizenship, shortened or paid military service or external voting.

In terms of its kin policy, Turkish state was again actively involved since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; nevertheless the articulation changed over time, again drastically with the changing perception vis-à-vis the co-ethnics. In the earlier periods, co-ethnics were defined in terms of their participation in the migration processes and population exchanges or not. They were either called as immigrants and refugees (muhacir ve mülteci) or non-exchanged populations (gayri mübadil/établis). The principle policy during this time was about determining the physical and social borders of the nation state, by defining those who were included and excluded.

With the mid 1940s the conceptualization in terms of immigration starting losing ground, despite the entry of forcefully displaced co-ethnics in the 1950s. Similar to the change in the perception vis-à-vis emigrants in the 1980s from distant workers to expatriates (gurbetçi), the tone regarding the co-ethnics changed after the 1940s from those who did not/were not able migrate to external Turks (duş Türkler) and Turkish factors (Türk unsurlar). During this second epoch that I categorize for both cases, the state acknowledged the permanent settlement of these flexibly included members abroad and made an effort to keep ties despite of distance. While the Turkish state was politically and administratively more involved in the emigrants in this second epoch, it was less engaged with the co-ethnics, who were already the citizens of the nation states in which they were living now for some time.
Table 1: State policies for emigrants and co-ethnics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State Policy</th>
<th>Official Naming</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State Policy</th>
<th>Official Naming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early period:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Promoting “returns” to</strong></td>
<td>1960s to 1980s</td>
<td>Promote emigration for employment; policy based on remittances and social security</td>
<td>Workers abroad, overseas workers</td>
<td>19th c. to 1940s</td>
<td>Managing settlement in Turkey; determination of citizenship question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>homeland</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>“Returns” at standstill:</td>
<td>1980s to early 1990s</td>
<td>Keeping ties without letting go of Turkish citizenship: early laws on flexible citizenship, elections, military service, organizations; exporting culture and education</td>
<td>Expatriates (gurbetçi), citizens (living) abroad</td>
<td>1940s to late 1980s</td>
<td>“Returns” at standstill (first by co-ethnics then by the state); keeping ties as kins; acceptance of forcefully displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Keeping ties despite of</strong></td>
<td>Mid 1990s to 2000s</td>
<td>Reactionary politics; early institutionalization for monitoring and coordination</td>
<td>Expatriates (gurbetçi), citizens (living) abroad</td>
<td>Late 1980s to 2000s</td>
<td>Fuzzy politics: Limitation of mobility and early institutionalization for monitoring, exporting culture and education; geographical expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>distance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+90 Transnationalism</td>
<td>From early 2000s onwards</td>
<td>Proactive institutionalization; investing in social capital upgrading; active involvement</td>
<td>Euro Turks, diasporas</td>
<td>From early 2000s onwards</td>
<td>Proactive institutionalization; developmental projects; investing in social capital upgrading; active involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kins and relative</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
It is necessary to note here that the 1980s were critical in terms of the determination about which groups among the emigrants were not to be perceived as overseas members of the Turkish state. This was very much related to emigration of political groups as well as citizens of Turkey from Kurdish and Alevi origin - who were considered as exceptional by the state-as political refugees to European countries after the 1980 coup d’état (Østergaard Nielsen 2003). While the ethnic and religious origin did not appear as determining in the first epoch, it became crucial in the second epoch, affecting the imminent policies of the state. In the trajectory about co-ethnics, the issue of those who are included and excluded had already been resolved in the early 1920s and 1930s with the population exchanges. In line with those who were accepted as *muhacir* in the early republic, not Kurds or Arabs but only the groups of Turkmen origin were accepted as immigrants after the Gulf War in 1990 (Danış 2011)\(^{13}\).

Reinforced by the nationalist rhetoric that embraced an imagined Turkish (speaking) world reaching “from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China” the two trajectories started to converge - at least within the public discourse - after the late 1980s. The period saw the early institutionalization, not only with the aim of managing the settlement or social policy domains such as employment or social security but in order to monitor, control and coordinate the actions and politics of included members abroad. It also comprised of a number enactments in order to “guard” or “restore” the Turkish culture among emigrants living in the European countries and the co-ethnics residing in the post-Soviet Balkans and Caucasus through mechanisms as establishing mosques or Turkish cultural centers offering education in Turkish language.

The history of the two trajectories that I have depicted above has illustrated the overlapping of the Turkish state’s changing interest in engaging with emigrants and co-ethnics. The conceptualization of the emigrants as “diasporas” is a novel phenomenon just occurred in the 2000s, arising among the business elites, then diffusing to the political discourse. In her study on Turkish and Kurdish emigrants in Germany in the early 2000s, Østergaard Nielsen (2003) had argued that the mobilizing measures of the Turkish state were reactionary rather than proactive, in an intention to control and monitor the political activism of the emigrants abroad. The discourse of diaspora also alleviates reactionary grounds for governing the acts of emigrants; however it also embraces an investment of social and political capital upgrading which permits a certain room for deliberate acting on the part of the emigrants. Emulated and adopted from the terminology of the “historical diasporic groups” with which the Turkish state had diplomatic issues in the past, such as the Armenians, Greek and Jews, the term diaspora embodies the competency of the emigrant groups, however under surveillance.

As illustrated above, the gathering of the different overseas communities under the same roof of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, as attached to the Prime

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\(^{13}\) The diverging approaches of the state to include and exclude certain populations could not find sufficient room in this paper, yet there is a rich literature which focuses on the policies regarding minorities and the immigrants of non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities in Turkey. See, Yeğen 1996; Bozarslan 1996; Işıduygı et al. 1999; Somer 2005 on minority and citizenship policies; and Kiřiçi 2000; Kaya 2004; Işıduygı and Kaygusuz 2004 on immigrant policies in Turkey.
Ministry, with the involvement of the former State Minister Responsible of External Turks, and the attachment of the Advisory Committee on Turkish Citizens Abroad is a crucial evidence for this change. Since 2012 the Presidency publishes a magazine entitled “Plus 90” (which is the telephone code of Turkey), assembling articles and in depth reviews about emigrants, co-ethnics and Turkic countries. Even though not always employed mot-à-mot, the understandings of transnationalism, (migrant) diasporas and accidental diasporas gain importance in this last epoch because of the state’s adoption of the meanings of these terms for describing, constructing, imagining its members abroad.

A comparison between committees elected in 1998 and 2012 to coordinate and monitor the Turks living abroad also illustrates this change. In 1998, the High Committee on Turkish Citizens Living Abroad was formed of parliamentarians, country representatives from mainly Germany (26 members), USA (3 members), France (3 members) and Holland (3 members) as well as other European countries, Australia and Canada and six state ministries. The Advisory Committee on Turkish Citizens Abroad which was elected in 2012 does not include parliamentarians but country representatives from European countries (including Germany - 18 members, France -6 members, Holland -4 members), USA (8 members), members from Balkans (4), Central Asia (3), Middle East and Africa (3) and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1). The number of participating state institutions increased drastically to 19 ministries and institutions. In addition, 10 honorary members were elected, representing Turks in eight western countries (see Table 2 in the Annex). The comparison illustrates that whereas the number of members representing the most populous host country has decreased, the geography has expanded to include new members among co-ethnic populations.

The discussion here suggests that the policies of the Turkish state regarding its members abroad has transformed in time, from struggling to establish and maintain definite physical and social borders to deliberately enjoying transnationalism. Even though different endogenous and exogenous factors have acted in diverging the two constellations, similar paths have also existed: in the early period, the state adopted a policy promoting and preparing environment for “returns”; in the second period it acknowledged permanent settlement and aimed at keeping ties despite of the distance; in the third, it began institutionalization for monitoring and controlling the overseas populations; and in the final period it became actively involved by bringing together domestic institutions and representatives of Turks from a wider geography.

**Conclusion**

The definitions of diasporas and accidental diasporas are similar to the definitions of ethnicity and nation à la Weber, signifying subjective beliefs in a common descent, which are

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propagated primarily by the political community, no matter how artificially organized (Weber 1996). Studies in the past have emphasized the role of the immigrants as crucial in the construction of a group feeling and the creation of an image of homeland. Bringing together the policies on emigrants and co-ethnics, this study has shown the role of the sending/kin state as promoting or impeding the political opportunity structures and formulating the cognitive/discursive sphere. In focusing only on the sending/kin state, the research did not argue for its primacy, but took into account a polycentric and interactive framework involving endogenous and exogenous factors.

By taking the case of modern Turkey with a distant history of rupture from an imperial to one-national-republican society, the research has expands the arguments of the previous researches on accidental diasporas. The flourishing scholarship on accidental diasporas focuses on the recent cases in which the close familial ties and the use of same language persisted across borders, which might facilitate the public imagination of common descent. However the Turkish case has shown that new ties and commonalities can be produced, reproduced or pre-acknowledged ties can be effaced during different periods of time by the states.
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### Annex

**Table 2: Comparison between the members of High Committee for Turkish Citizens Abroad (1998) and the members of Advisory Committee for Citizens Abroad (2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998 ¹⁶</th>
<th>2012¹⁷</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parliamentarians</strong></td>
<td>ANAP (1), CHP (1), DSP (1), DTP (1), DYP (1), FP (1).</td>
<td>Germany (18), USA (8), France (6), Holland (4), <strong>Balkans</strong> (4), <strong>Central Asia</strong> (3), <strong>Middle East and Africa</strong> (3), United Kingdom (3), Belgium (3), Australia (3), Austria (3), Canada (2), Sweden (2), Switzerland (2), Denmark (1), <strong>Finland</strong> (1), <strong>Italy</strong> (1), <strong>Norway</strong> (1), Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country representatives</strong></td>
<td>Germany (26), USA (3), France (3), Holland (3), Australia (2), Austria (1), Belgium (1), Canada (1), Denmark (1), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1), United Kingdom (1).</td>
<td>Germany (18), USA (8), France (6), Holland (4), <strong>Balkans</strong> (4), <strong>Central Asia</strong> (3), <strong>Middle East and Africa</strong> (3), United Kingdom (3), Belgium (3), Australia (3), Austria (3), Canada (2), Sweden (2), Switzerland (2), Denmark (1), <strong>Finland</strong> (1), <strong>Italy</strong> (1), <strong>Norway</strong> (1), Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honorary members</strong></td>
<td>USA (2), Germany (2), Austria (2), France (1), Holland (1), United Kingdom (1), Canada (1).</td>
<td>USA (2), Germany (2), Austria (2), France (1), Holland (1), United Kingdom (1), Canada (1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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